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*3-4<sup>th</sup> ..* *Annex 1 CA*

CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

JP(61)Note 37

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27th August, 1961

LIMITED CIRCULATION

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Note by the Directors of Plans

In accordance with the instructions<sup>+</sup> of the Chief of the Defence Staff, we examine below two draft directives<sup>Ⓢ</sup> to General Norstad, dealing with Berlin Contingency Planning. They have been prepared by the Quadripartite Military Group in Washington for consideration by the Ambassadorial Group on Monday 28th August. It is not clear whether the JACK PINE directive<sup>Ⓢ</sup> is intended to be added to the broad directive<sup>Ⓢ</sup>. Our comment on the former is in paragraph 10 below.

2. The new draft directive<sup>Ⓢ</sup> to General Norstad covering general planning is a compound of the draft directive<sup>Ⓢ</sup> prepared by General Norstad himself, and the proposed United Kingdom directive<sup>Ⓢ</sup> to the LIVE OAK staff.

3. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington<sup>+</sup> and the United Kingdom Member of the NATO Standing Group<sup>+</sup> have urged acceptance of the new, much broader, directive in order to ensure our participation in United States planning which is now proceeding rapidly.

4. It can be inferred from the first three paragraphs of the new directive that it will be issued by the Ambassadorial Group to General Norstad in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe.

5. Our comments below are related to the sections and paragraphs of the new directive<sup>Ⓢ</sup>.

Allied Aims and Responsibilities (Paragraphs 1-3)

6. Our only comment is about responsibilities. Many of the plans required by the directive will be beyond the scope of the LIVE OAK staff to prepare. If, as is later implied, it can be left to General Norstad to allocate responsibilities and work as he chooses between LIVE OAK and NATO staffs, the Nations outside the Quadripartite Powers must be clear where they stand both in planning and operational responsibilities. See paragraph 12 below.

- + COS.1080/27/8/61
- Ⓢ Annex 'A' to COS.1080/27/8/61
- Ⓢ Annex 'B' to COS.1080/27/8/61
- \* Annex to COS.1041/21/8/61
- Ⓢ Appendix to Annex to COS(61)284
- Ⓢ Washington to Foreign Office No.2092
- % GN 194

Forwarded to COS (61) 56  
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General Considerations (Paragraph 4)

7. Paragraph 4(a). This seems out of place. The integration and timing of military and non-military measures and their application over Berlin is for decision by Governments advised by the Ambassadorial Group. We suggest this paragraph should either be deleted or left in the informatory sense i.e. in the fourth line "will have to be" instead of "must be".

8. Paragraph 4(c). We have commented previously<sup>X</sup> that because of the dangers of rapid escalation, and as an earnest of the West's intentions, NATO must be on a war footing from the outset of any operations to restore access to Berlin. We therefore suggest in the second sentence that the words from "consistent with" to the end of the sentence be deleted and the following substituted: "co-ordinated with NATO preparations to undertake their assigned tasks if more general hostilities occur".

9. Paragraph 4(d). This outlines the circumstances of recourse to nuclear weapons. As a matter of military prudence we agree that plans to employ nuclear weapons should be made. The possibility of their use is correctly made subject to political authorization, but obviously in the circumstances envisaged an agree control system is urgently required. General Norstad should be asked to submit recommendations on this system.

Present and Additional Plans (paragraphs 5 to 7 and the JACK PINE draft directive)

10. Paragraph 5. The revision of present plans lists those undertaken by the LIVE OAK staff but proposes extension to the JACK PINE plans to include counter action against enemy airfield, AAA and missile sites and ground installations. This extension and the priority proposed for airlift plans arises from the contents of the recent Soviet Note over air access. We agree both the extension and priority on the grounds of the need for preparedness for any eventuality arising from hostile air action.

11. Paragraph 6. The additional military plans proposed in this paragraph are undoubtedly those which must fall within the responsibility of NATO and include expanded non-nuclear air and ground operations, and the selective use of nuclear weapons. Naval studies are proceeding in Washington and General Norstad is to be informed of their progress.

12. Paragraph 7. The responsibilities for both the planning and the conduct of operations, either for restoring access to Berlin or for those of wider scope, are not clear. They are, however, referred to in paragraphs 7(b) and (c) which require General Norstad to make recommendations about the means of assuring continuity of military control during the transition from tripartite to NATO control, and which state that the Tripartite Governments will effect co-ordination with the NATO authorities over matters within their competence. We still adhere to the view<sup>2</sup> that should operations occur on any scale greater than TRADE WIND, they will require the resources of NATO and should therefore become the responsibility of SACEUR. We feel, however, that at this stage no amendments need be proposed to the new directive. Our views can be represented later either by the UKNMR at SHAPE or after General Norstad's recommendations are known.

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Conclusions

13. We conclude that:-

- (a) Because of the over-riding need to proceed urgently with military plans to meet the Berlin situation, the new draft directives to General Norstad should be accepted, subject to the points made in paragraphs 7 to 9 above.
- (b) Comment on the definition of responsibilities for planning and the conduct of operations as between LIVE OAK and the NATO staffs, and between the Tripartite and NATO Nations, should be withheld until General Norstad's recommendations are received.

Recommendation

14. We recommend that, if they approve our report, the Chiefs of Staff should forward it to the Foreign Office as an expression of their views.

(Signed) D.C. STAPLETON  
W.D. O'BRIEN  
B.N.L. DITMAS.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.